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COMMENTS
VALUATION OF MINORS' INCOME INTERESTS
IN 2503(b) TRUSTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 2503(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides for
an annual gift tax excluion of $3,000.1 If the exclusion is to be allowed,
there must be a completed gift.2 The donor must be divested of all title,
dominion and control over the property transferred to a donee capable
of accepting a gift or to someone acting for the donee as a trustee or
agent capable of accepting it.3
Primary responsibility for payment of the tax rests upon the donor,4
but an exclusion is allowed for each donee.' If the gift is transferred in
trust, the trust beneficiary, rather than the trust itself, is considered the
donee of the gift.' Unlike the specific $30,000 exemption,7 which is an
exhaustible life-time exemption, the donee exclusion can be taken in
each year that a completed gift is made."
1 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §2503 provides:
(b) EXCLUSIONS FROM GIFTS-In the case of gifts (other
than gifts of future interests in property) made to any person by the
donor during the calendar year 1955 and subsequent calendar years, the
first $3,000 of such gifts to such person shall not for the purposes of sub-
section (a), be included in the total amount of gifts made during such
year. Where there has been a transfer to any person of a present inter-
est in property, the possibility that such interest may be diminished by
the exercise of a power shall be disregarded in applying this subsection,
if no part of such interest will at any time pass to any other person.
When the gift tax was enacted in the Revenue Act of 1932, the maximum ex-
clusion was $5,000. That figure was reduced to $4,000 in the Revenue Act of
1939 and to $3,000 in the Revenue Act of 1942 where it has remained to the
present time; MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFr AND ESTATE TAXATION, §38.01,
at 464, footnote 9 (1959). Gift splitting provisions introduced in the Revenue
Act of 1948, would allow an exclusion of up to $6,000 for a gift of a present
interest from a married couple to a donee during a calendar year, §2513 of the
1954 Code.
2 TREAS. REG. §25.2511-2(b) (1958) provides:
As to any property, or part thereof or interest therein, of which the
donor has so parted with the dominion and control as to leave in him no
power to change its disposition, whether for his own benefit or for the
benefit of another, the gift is complete.
3 Talge v. United States, 229 F. Supp. 836, 848 (WAr.D.Mo. 1964).
4 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §2502(d). However, under §6324(b) the donee becomes
personally liable if the tax is not paid by the donor when due; also see, Richard
H. Turner, 49 T.C. No. 38 (1968).
5 TREAs. REG. §25.2503-2 (1958).
6 Helvering v. Hutchings, 312 U.S. 393 (1941), conclusively decided that, for
gift tax purposes, the donee of a gift in trust is the trust beneficiary rather
than the trust itself. The case settled a dispute that had existed among the
lower courts.
7 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §2521.
8 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION, §38.03 (1959).
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II. PRESENT INTEREST Is REQUIRED
The interest conveyed must be a present interest if it is to qualify
for the gift tax exclusionY The term present interest has been construed
to mean, a right to use, possession and enjoyment commencing with the
completion of the gift.' 0 Where a transfer is made in trust, legal title
and possession of the trustecorpus will normally pass to the trustee."
The beneficiary's equitable interest may constitute a present interest in
income or corpus or both.12 An income interest may be regarded as a
present interest even though the interest in corpus is limited to take
effect in the future 3 or revert to the grantor at some future date.
4
However, although the donee may have a present interest in both corpus
and income, only one exclusion per donee will be allowed. 5 Of course,
if the trust is not drafted properly the donee will not receive a present
interest in either and no exclusion will be given.'6 There must be a pro-
vision for payments periodically, at least annually, if an interest in in-
come is to qualify as a present interest.'7 This seems only reasonable in
view of the definition of a present interest, i.e., the right to beneficial en-
joyment of the property."
III. VALUATION OFINcOME INTERESTS
Since section 2503(b) applies to the first $3,000 of a gift it is axio-
matic that the present interest transferred must have a determinable
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §2503 (b). The requirement of a present interest was
established in §504 of the Revenue Act of 1932 and retained in §1003 of the
1939 Code and §2503 of the 1954 Code.
10 Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1944) ; Fondren v. Commissioner, 324
U.S. 18 (1944) ; Suplee v. Smith, 242 F.2d 855 (3rd Cir. 1957).
11 BOGERT, TRuSTS AND TRusTEEs §181 (2d ed. 1960).
12 In Herman's Estate v. Commissioner, 235 F.2d 440, 443 (5th Cir. 1956), the
court stated:
Either or both [corpus or income] may be a present interest to which
the exclusion would be applicable and either or both may be a future
interest with respect to which the exclusion would be denied. The fact
that one of these may be regarded as a future interest does not of itself
prevent the other from being a present interest.
1 Albright v. United States, 308 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Fisher v. Commissioner,
132 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1942).
14 In RE v. RUL. 58-242, 1958-1 CuM. BULL. 251, income was payable to the donors
daughter and the corpus was to revert to the donor after 10 years and 6 months.
3 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION §38.24 (1959).
16 Note 10 supra.
17 In Sensenbrenner v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 883 (7th Cir. 1943), income was
to be paid quarterly or oftener, to or for the use of the beneficiary; see also,
Albright v. United States, 308 F.2d 739 (5th Cir. 1962) ; Fisher v.Commissioner,
132 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1942).
1s In Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442, 449 (1944), the Court stated:
In the absence of some indication from the face of the trust or surround-
ing circumstances that a steady flow of some ascertainable portion of in-
come to the minor would be required, there is no basis for a conclusion
that there is a gift of anything other than for the future.
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value.19 In Margaret A. C. Riter,20 the taxpayers wife was to receive
the income of two trusts during the minority of the couple's two chil-
dren, but the trustee could invade the corpus of either trust at any time
for the benefit of the children. The commissioner refused to allow the
exclusion on the basis that the power to invade could be used to destroy
the trusts. In affirming the commissioner's ruling the Tax Court stated:
"Since we are unable to compute any value for the present interest of the
wife, we can not hold that the respondent erred in refusing to allow an
exclusion based on her right to receive the income." 21
Since there may be a situation where it is unrealistic to assign a zero
value to a present interest as in the Riter case, a court may allow the
exclusion if some minimum value can be ascertained. In William Harry
Kniep,22 the taxpayer created a trust for the benefit of six persons, the
income of which was to be paid annually until each respective beneficiary
reached age sixty, at which time each was to receive his proportionate
share of the trust corpus. The trustee was given the power to invade the
corpus for the benefit of the income beneficiaries in the event of an
emergency, but not in excess of one thousand dollars per beneficiary per
year. The Tax Court held that the right to income constituted present
interests, which qualified for the exclusion, only to the extent to which
such interests were not exhaustible by the exercise of the power to in-
vade. Thus, the exclusion was applied to the present value of each income
interest assuming an annual invasion of corpus of one thousand dollars
per beneficiary per year.
In valuing a transfer for gift tax purposes, the value of the property
on the date of the transfer is considered to be the amount of the gift."3
It is imperative, therefore, that any interests transferred have some
19 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION, §38.08 (1959). For ex-
amples of present interests held incapable of valuation, see Fischer v. Commis-
sioner, 288 F.2d 574 (3rd Cir. 1961); Funkhouser's Trusts v. Commissioner,
275 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1960) ; Commissioner v. Lowden, 131 F.2d 127 (7th Cir.
1942); Van Den Wymelenberg v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Wis.
1967); Sylvia H. Evans, 17 T.C. 206 (1951), aff'd., 198 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir.
1952). The valuation problem appears to be one of the primary reasons for
restricting the exclusion to a present interest. In United States v. Pelzer, 312
U.S. 399, 403 (1941), a trust was created for eight minor children and for
possible afterborn children. Income was to be accumulated and paid out at the
end of the trust period, which was ten years. In holding the income interests
to be future interests under a predacessor of 2503(b), the Supreme Court ex-
amined the legislative history of the section and learned: "The denial of the
exemption in the case of gifts of future interests is dictated by the apprehended
difficulty, in many instances of determining the number of eventual donees and
the value of their respective gifts." (emphasis added)
20 3 T.C. 301 (1944).
21 Id. at 303.
229 T.C. 943 (1947), aff'd., 172 F.2d 755 (8th Cir. 1949). Although the statutory
basis for the decision has been changed (see last sentence of 2503(b), note 1
supra) it would appear that the requirement of at least some ascertainable
minimum value is still a valid criteria in qualifying an income interest for the
exclusion.
23 INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 §2512; Elsie McK. Morgan, 42 T.C. 1080 (1964), aff'd.
per curiam, 353 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. den., 384 U.S. 918 (1966).
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reasonably determinable value at that time.2 4 While there is no doubt
that an unqualified right to regular income payments can constitute a
present interest in such income,25 for example, a gift conveying an in-
come interest for a term of years, the Regulations state three require-
ments for valuing such an interest 6 First, the time span over which the
income interest is to be distributed must be calculable. If a minor bene-
ficiary were to receive the corpus when he attained his majority, the
term of the trust would be the difference between his present age and
twenty-one, the age at which the income interest would terminate. Of
course, a well drafted trust would provide for a gift over in the event
of the beneficiary's death before the corpus was to be paid. Assuming
that the beneficiary's life expectancy exceeds the age at which corpus is
to be paid to him, the proper method of computing the term is as is men-
tioned in this paragraph and not based upon the beneficiary's life expect-
ancy.27 Second, the total value of the income producing property must
be determinable by a reasonable approximation. If the principal were
marketable securities, their market value at the date of the gift might be
used. Third, the actuarial factor which is provided in the appropriate
table of the Regulations28 must be determined. The tables are not simply
mortality tables, but combine an assumed rate of return (3%) with
life expectancy or a stated term of years.29 By using the proper figure
from the appropriate table, one simple computation reveals the present
value of the gift in question, which is the amount of the gift for tax
purposes. For purposes of illustration, assume that the corpus of a trust
is $20,000, that the beneficiary is fifteen years of age and is entitled to
receive income of the trust until he is age twenty-five. Assuming the
beneficiary's life expectancy is greater than age twenty-five, the income
interest to be valued is for a term of years. Table II is the applicable
table:30 The income interest would be valued by multiplying the value of
the property ($20,000) by .291081, the appropriate figure from column
three of Table II. Such a computation equals $5,821.62. The taxpayer
would be obligated to pay tax on $2,821.62, the present value of the gift
less the $3,000 exclusion.31 As can readily be seen, simple interest on
21 Note 22 supra.
2.3 Note 17, supra.
2r TREas. REG. §25.2512 (1958).
27 Fischer v. Commissioner, 132 F2d 383, 386 (9th Cir. 1942) ; Leonard Rosen, 48
T.C. 834 (1967) (Taxpayer used the wrong table).
28 TREAs. REG. §25.2512-5 (f) (1958) (Table I applies to a life interest, Table II
applies to an interest for a term certain).
29 Ibid. Compare, DUNHAM, Valuing Life Estates and Remainders, 107 TRUSTS
AND ESTATES 13 (1968), where the author argues that specific experience tables
should be used instead of the patent assumptions of the Regulations.30 Note 28 supra; Leonard Rosen, 48 T.C. 834 (1967), rev'd - F.2d - (4th
Cir. 1968) ; Carl E. Weller, 38 T.C. 790 (1962).31 The computation assumes that the gift does not qualify under the gift splitting
provisions applicable to husband and wife under §2513, and that the donor's
$30,000 lifetime exemption under §2521 has been exhausted.
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$20,000 for ten years would yield income of $7,000 not $5,821.62. How-
ever, the table -computes the present value of the income to be received,
which is the amount of the gift for tax purposes.
3 2
IV. DISCRETIONARY'POWERS AFFECTIN G VALUATION
When a fiduciary is given a'discretionary power regarding a trust, a
determination must be made of how that power effects the rights of the
trust beneficiary. 33 Valuation problems may arise if the exercise'of such
a power would permit possible impairment or destruction of a present
interest subsequent to the creation of the trust.34-
A. EXTENT OF DISCRETION
Even though a trustee is granted a discretionary power he is nor-
mally subject to various fiduciary duties and is subject to court control
for violation of those duties.35 The extent, of the trustee's discretion may
have an important bearing on his duties, because the. amount of court
control varies with the discretion given.?
The extent of discretion is commonly classified as "mere" or "un-
qualified" discretion as distinguished from "absolute" or "uncontrolled"
discretion.37 The latter half of the classification is a misnomer and tends
to cause confusion because, if construed literally, it would absolve the
trustee of all fiduciary duties regarding, the exercise of the power and
thereby make the trust void.38 The true nature of the extent of discretion
question may be summed up as follows:
It may be argued that the only difference in the attitude of the
courts with regard to mere and absolute discretionary powers is
one of degree, in that they are more easily persuaded to find an
improper use of an absolute or uncontrolled power.3 (emphasis
added)
The above inconsistency is mentione*d only to alert the reader to the
construction usually given such terms as "absolute" or "uncontrolled"
discretion, because they are so commonly used.
The Restatement of Trusts, recognizes the distinction between a
mere grant of discretion, and a grant of "absolute" or "uncontrolled"
discretion.4 0 For convenience of discussion, the former will be referred
to by this writer as simple discretion and the latter as extended discretion,
even though the Restatement does not clearly designate them as such.4"
32 Note 23 supra.
33 Duffey v. United States, 182 F.Supp. 765 (D. Minn. 1960).
3.1 MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL GiFr AND ESTATE TAXATION, §38.07 at 484 (1959).
35 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §187 (1959).
36 Id., Comment i and j.
3 BOGERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES §560, at 103 (2d ed. 1960).
3S Id. at 120.
39 Id. at 125.
40 Note 36, supra.
41 This terminology is used in HALBACH, Problems of Discretiton in Discretionary
Trists, 61 COL. L. REv. 1425 (1961), and 50 MARQ. L. REv. 559 (1967).
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If the fiduciary is empowered to exercise simple discretion, he is under
a duty to the beneficiary to exercise that degree of care and skill that a
man of ordinary prudence would exercise in dealing with his own
property.42 Under a grant of an extended power of discretion, the duty
of acting within the standard of reasonableness is relaxed.4 3 The fiduci-
ary must act in a state of mind in which it was contemplated by the
setttor that he. would act.44 Under such a grant of discretion, "the trustee
will not be permitted to act dishonestly, or from some motive other than
the accomplishment of the purposes of the trust, or ordinarily to act arbi-
trarily without an exercise of his judgement.45
Wisconsin apparently adheres to the Restatement classification, 46
although two recent cases that dealt with the issue have not expressly
stated the position of the court.4 7 In a case of extended discretion the
court has held the trustee to the duty of acting in good faith.48 The good
faith standard does not require the duty to exercise reasonable judge-
ment, but only that the fiduciary not act dishonestly, arbitrarily or in
contravention of the express or implied purposes of the trust.
49
When a fiduciary is given a discretionary power regarding the ad-
ministration of a trust, the extent of his discretion is determined by state
law.50 This in turn may control the application or non-application of the
gift tax exclusion,"' as will be discussed in some of the following sub-
sections dealing with specific discretionary powers.
Although this writer has discovered no consistent differentiation in
cases involving extended discretion as opposed to cases where the trustee
has simple discretion; most courts and legal scholars continue to con-
sider the tw6 concepts as viable legal principles,52 and for that reason
are dealt with in this article only to aid the reader in a more meaningful
analysis of the tax cases to be discussed. The extent of the trustee's dis-
cretion will be mentioned in various tax cases only. as a point of in-
formation, and distinguished only in specific cases where a valid compari-
son can be made. It would seem that part of the reasorl why courts do
not systematically differentiate between the effects of the two measures
4 2 RESTATEfAENT (SECOND), TRusTs'§174 (1959).
43 RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), TRusTs §187, Comment i (1959).
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 In re Koos Estate, 269 Wis. 478, 69 N.W.2d 598 (1955); Estate of Teasdale,
261 Wis. 248, 52 N.W.2d 366 (1952) ; Estate of Wells, 156 Wis. 294, 144 N.W.
174 (1914).
47 Estate of Schiebe, 30 Wis.2d 116, 140 N.W.2d 196 (1966), noted in 50 MARQ. L.
REv. 559 (1967) ; Will of Clarenbach, 23 Wis.2d 71, 126 N.W. 614 (1964), noted
in 48 MARQ. L. REv. 262 (1964) and in 1965 Wis. L. REv. 391.4s Note 46, supra. For a discussion of the current Wisconsin position, see 50 MARQ.
L. REv. 559 (1967).
49 In re Koos Estate, 269 Wis. 478, 69 N.W.2d 598 (1955).
50 Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 160 (1942).
51 Frances Carroll Brown, 30 T.C. 831 (1958).
52 HAACH,tProblets of Discretion in Discretionary Trusts, 61 COL..L. REv. 1425
(1961).
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of discretion is that in many instances the outcome of a case would be
the same under either.
B. POWER TO INVADE CORPUS
Under the 1939 Code,53 the power of a trustee to invade corpus in
favor of anyone, including an income beneficiary, might result in failure
of a gift of an income interest to qualify for the gift tax exclusion.54 In
Funkhousers Trusts v. Commissioner,5- the donor established seventeen
trusts for his five children and twelve grandchildren. The trust benefici-
aries had an unqualified right to trust income, from the time of creation
of the trusts until twenty-one years after the death of the last survivor
of the grantor's children or until death of the last surviving descendant
of the grantor. The trustees were given extended discretion to invade
the corpus of the trust for the benefit of an income beneficiary or for
any member of his or her immediate family. The court conceded the fact
that the unqualified right of beneficiaries to receive income was a present
interest but, the gift tax exclusions were denied because the income in-
terests were not susceptible of valuation. The court reasoned:
The right of the income beneficiaries to receive income was de-
pendent upon the existence and amount of a corpus from which
the income was to be derived. There was no certainty as to dura-
tion or amount. The corpus of any trust could have been reduced
at any time, in any amount (with corresponding reduction of in-
come productivity) .... 56
The 1954 Code has eliminated this problem of valuing an income in-
terest, even though the fiduciary has the power to invade corpus, as long
as the power of invasion may be exercised only for the benefit of the in-
come beneficiary.5" The Regulations provide the following example.:
Example (4). Under the terms of a trust the net income is to
be paid to F for life with the remainder payable to G on F's
death. The trustee has the uncontrolled power to pay over the
corpus to F at any time. Although F's present right to the income
may be terminated, no other person has the right to such income
interest. Accordingly, the power in the trustee is disregarded in
determining the value of F's present interest. The power would
not be disregarded to the extent that the trustee during F's life
could distribute the corpus to persons other than F.58
53 INT. REV. CODE OF 1939 §1003.
54 Funkhouser's Trusts v. Commissioner, 275 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1960) (The case
dealt with a trust created under the 1939 Code which gave the trustee extended
discretion) ; Evans v. Commissioner, 198 F.2d 435 (3rd Cir. 1952).
55 275 F.2d 245 (4th Cir. 1960).
56 Id. at 247.
57 §2503(b) (last sentence) "Where there has been a transfer to any person of a
present interest in property, the possibility that such interest may be dimin-
ished by the exercise of a power shall be disregarded in applying this subsec-
tion, if no part of such interest will at any time pass to any other person."
58 TREAs. REG. §2 5.2503-3(c) (1958); see also, Estate of Brigid Angela Casey, 25
T.C. 707, 718 (1956), decided under the 1939 Code, but recognized that a differ-
ent result would have followed if the 1954 Code were applicable; MERTENS,
LAW OF FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION, §38.22 (1959).
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Although the Funkhouser case is not authority for a trust created
under the 1954 Code, involving a power to invade corpus in favor of an
income beneficiary, it appears that the basis for the decision would still
be applicable to a trust where the fiduciary had power to invade in favor
of someone else. For this reason a draftsman should limit the trustee's
power to invade corpus so it is exercisable only in favor of the income
beneficiary whose income interests is to be valued. In a trust created
for the benefit of several income beneficiaries, it would appear that the
invasion of corpus would have to be on a pro rata basis. Otherwise
corpus could be paid to one beneficiary and thereby completely destroy
the intereests of the others.
C. POWER TO TERMINATE THE TRUST
Under the 1939 Code the effect of a power to terminate the trust had
substantially the same effect on an income interest as a power to invade
corpus.59 If the trustee had no traditionally worded power to invade
corpus, but had discretion to terminate the trust the amount of corpus
would remain constant but, the uncertainty of the duration of the trust
would make the income interest incapable of valuation. An excellent case
in point is La Fortune v. Commissioner,6" in which several donors cre-
ated twenty-nine trusts for their minor children, the income of which
was to be paid to the respective beneficiaries or their guardians until the
beneficiaries attained the age of twenty-one. A gift over was provided
for in the event of a donee's death before attaining majority. Thirteen
trusts established in 1951-2 contained a clause giving the fiduciary power
to terminate the trust, 6' while sixteen trusts created in 1953-4, contained
no such clause. The court allowed the exclusion claimed under the 1953-4
trusts, but denied the donor's contention that the 1951-2 trusts also quali-
fied for the exclusion. The court reasoned:
The value of a present right to income given in a trust is cal-
culated by multiplying the expected annual return by the probable
period over which it will be paid. In the case of the 1951-2 gifts,
the probable period over which the income will be paid is uncer-
tain because the trustee has the discretionary right of termina-
tion.6 2
This writer has discovered no case authority on this specific point
but, it would appear that under the 1954 Code, if upon termination of
the trust, the corpus was payable only to the income beneficiary, the trust
would qualify for the exclusion.6" In essence, neither the power to term-
59 La Fortune v. Commissioner, 263 F.2d 186 (10th Cir. 1958).
60 Ibid.
61 Id. at 189, "Trustee shall have the right and authority, in his or her sole discre-
tion, to terminate this trust at any time he or she deems it for the best interests
of the beneficiary to do so...
62 Id. at 192.
63 Note 58 supra, example 4 seems to be either a very broad power to invade or a
power to terminate.
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inate nor the power to invade would have a substantial effect on the
valuation problem if corpus could be paid only to the income beneficiary
of the trust.
D. POWER TO SELL AND REINVEST CORPUS
An income interest of a gift in trust, otherwise incapable of valua-
tion because the corpus consists of non-income producing property may
qualify for the gift tax exclusion if the fiduciary has the power to dispose
of such property and invest in property that will generate income on a
regular basis. 64 Of course, the burden is on the taxpayer to demonstrate
that the trustees are expected to exercise this power for the benefit of the
beneficiaries and that they will probably do so. 6 5 It appears that a donor
of a gift of income who is interested in an annual exclusion would be
inviting a challenge from the Internal Revenue Service on the valuation
aspect, if he transferred non-income producing property and relied only
on the trustee's power to sell and reinvest to justify his claim to the gift
tax exclusion. This is so because of the requirement that the interest
donated must have a reasonably ascertainable value on the date the gift
is completed.66 However, such an argument may prove to be valuable at
the litigation stage.
If the original corpus'of a trust is income producing in nature, it
would appear that a grant to a fiduciary of a power to sell and reinvest
may be desirable in the event of changed circumstances in the future.
The argument Would have to be asserted'that such power would be exer-
cis'ed only to maintain principal capable of generating income. In this
connection, it appears that a grant of'simple; rather than extended, dis-
cretion might give the donor a stronger argument in asserting that the
power would only be exercised in the desired manner because the grant
of simple discretion required the fiduciary to use reasonable judgement
in the administration of the trust.
E. POWER TO ACCUMULATE INCOME
A power to accumulate may render an income interest incapable of
valuation,r 7 because there must be a reasonably ascertainable flow of in-
come to the trust beneficiary if the gift is to qualify for the gift tax ex-
clusion.68 The Regulations provide the following example of the dangers
involved if the trustee is given the power to accumulate income:
64 See, Leonard Rosen, 48 T.C. 834 (1967), reV/d -F.2d - (4th Cir. 1968).
A case involving stock that had never paid dividends.
65 Id. at 847.
66 Note 23 supra.
67 Prejean v. Commissioner, 354 F.2d 995 (5th Cir. 1966); Fischer v. Commis-
sioner, 288 F.2d 574 (3rd Cir. 1961) ; Camiel Thorrez, 31'T.C. 655 (1959), aff'd.
per curiam, 272 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1959); see generally, MERTENS, LAW OF
FEDERAL GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATIoN §38.32 (1959).
68 Commissioner v. Disston, 325 U.S. 442 (1944) and Fondren v. Commissioner,
324 U.S. 18 (1944), held that the trustee's discretion to accumulate income
made gifts in trust future intereests and, therefore, they did not qualify for
the exclusion.
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P ainple '(I)." Und-tie 'teims of' 'a trust created by A, the'
,trtdstee'is 'ditect6d to pay'the'net income,to.-R, so long as B shall
live. The trustee is authorized during any period he deems advis-
able to add such income, to the trust corpus. Since B's right to re-
ceive the income payments is subject to* ihe truste's 'discretion,
'it is not a" present interest" and no exclusion is allowable with
tdspect to the transfer in trust.6 9
I Camiel Thorrez,7 0 the donor conveyed aten percent interest in a
partnership in trust to each, of his' four children for the benefit' of his
ten minor grandchildren. The trust stated that income was to be accumu-
lated until each beneficiary reached the age of 'twenty-ofne, unless the
trustee'deemed i~t advisable to use part of the trust'income'for the benefit
of a donee before that time, or if'a beneficiary should need money for
support or education and. be inable t'j provide it. The Tax Court held
the income interests incapable 'of valuation and denied the exclusion.
The court reasoned:
There is always the question of h6w much, if any, of the income
or principal 'of each trust can actually be applied in any year for
the permitted purpose of the support or education of a beneficiary.
The existence of a discretionary power, upon the occurence of a
specified contingency, to make payments from the trust estate to
a beneficiary or his legal guardian gives no clue to the amounts
that will be needed for the stated purpbse or to the requirements
for support and education that were foreseeable at the time the
gifts were made.'
The danger of granting a fiduciary the power to accumulate income
can readily be seen if the donor is interested in utilizing the donee exclu-
sion, but such a gift in trust may still qualify for the exclusion if it can
successfully be argued that the 'trustee was required to use the trust
property as if held by him as a guardian for the donee,' 2 or the trust
otherwise provided for a guardian over the property.7 3 In United States
v. Baker,7 4 the trust provided that the net income and principal of the
trust were to be used for the support, education or benefit of a beneficiary
in such amounts and manner and at such times as shall be in accordance
with the needs and best interests of the beneficiary, as if the trustee were
holding the property as a guardian.7 5 The court allowed the exclusion
because ,the trustee's broad powers and fiduciary obligations made the
transfers equivalent to outright gifts. In view of the alternatives avail-
69 TREAs. REG. §25.2503-3(c) (1958).
70 31 T.C. 655 (1959) aff'd. per cuiriarn, 272 F.2d 945 (6th Cir. 1959).
7 Id. at 666.
72 United States v. Baker, 236 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1956); Rtv. RUL. 59-78, 1959-1
CuM. BULL. 690.
73 Kieckhefer v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 118 (7th Cir. 1951) ; contra, Stifel v.
Commissioner, 197 F.2d 107 (2nd Cir. 1954) ; the Stifel case is distinguished at,
REv. RuL. 59-78, 1959-1 Cum. BULL. 690.74 Note 72 supra.
5 Id. at 319.
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able a guardianship appears to be an undesirable means of qualifying a
gift for the annual exclusion, but the argument might prove to be valu-
able during litigation.
F. DISCRETION TO ALLOCATE BETWEEN INCOME AND CORPUS
A fiduciary may be granted a discretionary power to allocate income
of a trust between income and principal.76 The effect that such a power
has on the problem of valuation of an income interest may depend in
large measure upon the extent of discretion bestowed upon the trustee,7
and the apparent intent of the settlor.7 1 In Frances Carroll Brown,7 9 the
donor transferred corporate stock valued at $175,000 in trust, the in-
come of which was payable to four named beneficiaries for life with the
remainder to charity. The trustees were granted extended discretion to
allocate receipts of the trust between income and principal.8 0 The court
held that the grant of absolute discretion to the trustees did not bar a
court of equity from controlling an abuse of discretion. The court stated:
To hold that the trustee has the power under an absolute discre-
tion clause to cut off all the rights of the life tennant would confer
upon the trustee the power to destroy one of the primary purposes
of the trust, i.e., the purpose to benefit the life tennant. An at-
tempted destruction of one of the purposes of the trust would con-
stitute an abuse of discretion which the courts would control.,,
The court went on to decide that the gifts of income constituted pres-
ent interests that were capable of valuation. The court held:
A careful reading of the whole indenture of trust indicates
that the intention of the settlor was to give the income beneficiaries
a substantial present interest and nowhere does it appear that she
intended to favor remaindermen to their income [income benefici-
arie's] detriment. It does not appear that the trustee's discretion-
76 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §233 (1959).
77 Id. comment p.
78 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TRUSTS §187, comment j (1959).
7930 T.C. 831 (1958). The principal issue was whether or not the gift of income
was a present or a future interest, but the court decided the valuation problem
presented the same issues.
80 Id. at 832, the trust provides:
(f) Dividends, interest, rents, and other similar payments, other than
liquidating dividends, received in cash by the Trustees shall normally be
dealt with as income, whether ordinary or extraordinary, and whether or
not in the nature of dividends on mining stocks or other assets of a
wasting nature, . . . and whether or not the securities to which they re-
late shall have been purchased at a premium and irrespective of the
character of the assets or account out of which they are paid or the time
when they shall have accrued or accumulated or shall have been earned,
declared or made payable, but the Trustees are authorized, in their abso-
lute discretion, to allocate the whole or any part of any such payment to
principal, if they shall deem such action adviseable for any reason.
[Emphasis added]
The issue of the corresponding rights and duties of the trustees and benefici-
aries was decided under Maryland law.
81 Id. at 836.
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ary powers were granted for any other purpose than to facilitate
administration of the trust.
8 2
In Van Den Wymelenberg v. United States,83 the donors established
a trust for their twelve minor grandchildren. The trust corpus consisted
of real estate worth $132,500, but subject to a mortgage of $82,500. In-
come of the trust was to be distributed annually, but the corpus was not
to be paid to a beneficiary until he reached the age of twenty-one. The
trustee was given, what appeared to be, extended discretion in dealing
with the trust property, which included the power to sell and reinvest
corpus and to allocate trust receipts and expenditures between principal
and income. 4 Without stating what language of the trust was most
heavily relied upon in making its decision the court held that the income
interests did not qualify for the exclusion because they were incapable of
valuation. The court reasoned:
The trustee not only can apportion between principal and income,
but can also alter the trust asset. By use of the latter prerogative,
the trustee could revise the asset holdings so that only a minimal
amount of income was derived for the present; on the other hand,
the trustee could change the corpus to a wasting asset which would
produce a great amount of income while consuming the principal.
None of these decisions on the part of the trustee would necessar-
ily be improper or a violation of her fiduciary responsibilities. 5
S2 Id. at 837.
83272 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Wis. 1967), aff'd - F2d - (7th Cir. 1968).
S4 The case does not contain any statement of the trust language relied upon by
the court. The following are excerpts from the trust instrument:
... [T]he Trustee may perform every act in the management of the trust
estate which individuals may perform in the management of like property
owned by them free of any trust and may exercise every power with
respect to each item of property in the trust estate, real and personal,
which individual owners of like property can exercise,...
J. To determine whether any money or other property coming into
the hands of the Trustee is part of the principal of the trust fund or in-
come therefrom, and to apportion between principal and income any loss
or expenditures which, in Trustee's opinion, should be apportioned, as the
Trustee may deem just and equitable, .. . and any such determination as
between corpus and income so made by said Trustees in good faith shall
be conclusive and binding upon the beneficiaries and any other persons
who may be interested in said trust fund.
7. Every action taken by said Trustee pursuant to the powers con-
ferred hereby, or any decision made by said Trustee in the exercise of the
discretion herein given to the Trustee, shall be conclusive and binding
upon the beneficiaries and upon all persons concerned therein or affected
thereby.
9. The Trustee shall not at any time be held liable for mistake of
law or fact, or of both law and fact, or errors of judgment nor for any
loss coming to said trust fund, or to a beneficiary thereunder or to any
person except through actual fraud or wilful misconduct on the part of
the Trustee. [Emphasis added]
85 Note 83 supra, at 574.
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Although the court did not expressly mention the extent of the fidu-
ciary's discretion and her corresponding duties,. nor the effect that ex-
tended discretion would have on the issue of valuation, one might con-
tend that the last sentence of the above quote implies re~ognitiori of the
Restatement position that a grant of extended discretion to a fiduciary
only requires that he act in good faith. The argument could be made that
a fiduciary could deal with the trust property as the court suggested,
while acting in good faith, but would be abusing discretion if he acted
in such a manner while held to the standard of exercising reasonable
judgement. Therefore, the court probably viewed the trustee as holding
an extended grant of discretion.s 6
The Van Den Wymelenberg and Brown cases may be distinguished
on the basis of the purpose for which the trusts were established.s7 In
the Brown case the beneficiaries were to receive income for life and the
remainder was payable to charity. Obviously the primary purpose of the
trust was to provide a continuous flow of income to the life beneficiaries.
In the Van Den Wymelenberg case the beneficiaries were to receive in-
come until their majority with the remainder to be distributed to them
at that time. There was no express or implied preference to provide
regular income rather than to retain as much of the property as possible
until corpus was to be distributed.
V. PROBABILITIES
The courts are often compelled to look beyond the area of discretion
to the question of probabilities in assessing the ramifications of a dis-
cretionary power upon a trust beneficiary's interests. There is an obvious
overlapping in considering the question of discretion and probabilities,
but the latter has a broader thrust than discretion and, therefore, is often
resorted to in an effort to determine whether or not an income interest
is capable of valuation. The reason for this examination is predicated
8s Because the settlor in the Van Den Wymelenberg case expressly granted the
trustee discretion to determine what trust receipts constituted income and prin-
cipal, it would seem appropriate that the application of the WISCONSIN UNI-
FORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME Act, Wis. STAT. §231.40(2) (1965), was not made
an issue in the case. Perhaps by implication this case will serve to dissipate
some of the confusion caused by Will of Clarenbach, 23 Wis.2d 71, 126 N.W.2d
614 (1964). The Clarenbach case is severely criticized in, NOTE, 1965 Wis. L.
REv. 391.
s7 BOERT, TRUSTS AND TRUSTEaS §560 at 119 (2d ed. 1960), provides:
Notwithstanding the fact that a literal interpretation of these grants of
absolute and uncontrolled discretionary powers would seem to sanction
any action taken by the trustee thereunder and leave the courts power-
less to intervene, such a construction has not been given to them. The
settlor has created a trust to accomplish certain objectives. When he gives
his trustee great freedom of action in administration of the trust, he
surely must intend the qualification that the trustee shall act with some
regard to the purposes of the trust, and not make decisions which frus-
trate the accomplishment of the settlor's intent; and also that he shall
employ his discretion deliberately and with some thought and not reck-
lessly or capriciously, and furtrermore in a spirit of good faith and hon-
esty. [Emphasis added]
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upon the necessity of assigning some reasonably ascertainable value to a
gift in trust on the date the gift is completed,88 if it is to qualify for the
annual donee exclusion.
The leading case on this subject is Hugh McK. Jonds,s 9 in whichthe
court held that valuation of income interests would be allowed if: (1) a
power of encroachment was limited by an ascertainable standard, and
(2) the possibility of encroachment being made in accordance with such
standard was so remote as to be negligible. 90 Jones created separate
irrevocable trusts for his four adult children under which they were to
receive income for life, with remainder to the respective beneficiary's
issue per stirpes. The donor and a corporate trust company were desig-
nated co-trustees. The trustees were given simple discretionary power
to invade the corpus of the trusts for the use and benefit of the benefici-
aries for their proper maintenance, education and support, in the manner
in which they were accustomed, or for'any other purpose that the trustee
might deem reasonable under the circumstances. The court declared that
invasion of corpus' for the respective beneficiary's proper maintenance,
education, support etc. ... constituted an ascertainable standard.- Fur-
thermore, the court found that because of the financial position of the
respective adult beneficiaries, the possibility of encroachment of the
principal 'which would defeat th flow of income was so remote as to be
negligible.
The grantor also created an irrevocable trust for four minor children
of his deceased son. The trust provided that during the minority of the
beneficiaries the'co-trustees could use and apply so much of the net in-
come and 'principal of the respective shares of each minor as deemed
necessary for their proper education, maintenance and- support. Upon
reaching majority, the beneficiaries were to receive the entire income
from their respective shares until the principal was completely distributed
at various ages. In applying the above mentioned criteria to the trusts
for the minor beneficiaries, the court found that the interests were not
capable of valuation. The trust provisions established an ascertainable
standard for limiting the power to invade but, the possibility of exercis-
ing that power within the standard was by no means remote. Such an
invasion could deplete the corpus and completely destroy the income
interests. Although the precise basis for the Jones decision (the effect
on valuation of the trustee's power to invade corpus in favor of an in-
come beneficiary) has been overruled by a statute,91 the principle enunci-
ated in that case is still viable and the decision has been cited with ap-
S8 Note 23 supra.
89 29 T.C. &200 (1957) (The case is decided under the 1939 Code, when the power
to invade in favor of anyone including the income beneficiary might make the
income in interest incapable of valuation).
90 Id. at 211.
91 §2503 (b).
1967-68]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
proval in subsequent cases involving various discretionary powers of a
fiduciary.9 2
The possibility of action on the part of the trustee to alter the trust
corpus in accordance with an ascertainable standard must be so remote
as to be negligible. In Jolley v. United States,93 the donor established a
trust for his three adult children who were named trustees as well as
primary beneficiaries. Income was to be paid to the beneficiaries for ten
years in monthly or quarterly installments. The trustees were given ex-
tended discretion to use all or part of the corpus of the trust for the
support, maintenance, education, comfort and benefit of any issue of a
primary beneficiary. After citing the Jones case with approval, the court
held that the income interests were capable of valuation. The opinion
states: "In the Jolley, Sr. Trust proceedings there has been in evidence
substantial evidence that the use of corpus for the support, education
and maintenance of the beneficiaries would be extremely remote. '9 4
There must be a standard limiting the trustees power of encroach-
ment. In the Van Den Wymelenberg case, 95 the court cited the Jones
case and stated the rule to be applied almost verbatim from that decision.96
Although the trustee in Van Den Wyrnelenberg did not have direct
power to invade the corpus of the trust for the benefit of the grand-
children she had "powers which could significantly effect the income
available to the beneficiaries." 97 The precise reasons for the court's deci-
sion are not expressly stated in the opinion but, it might be argued that
the probability question was the courts real basis for denying the exclu-
sion. Clearly, there was no ascertainable standard to guide the trustee in
determining when to alter the trust corpus or in determining how to
allocate receipts and expenditures between income and corpus. Because
Judge Gordon cited the Jones case it is indicative of concern over the
absence of a standard, but whether he would have gone on to examine
the second part of the probabilities test is doubtful in view the fact
the trustee's discretionary powers could be exercised to the benefit or the
detriment of the trust beneficiary.
While Jones indicates that the standard can be fairly broad, and
Jolley indicates that extended discretion is not necessarily fatal, Wyrnel-
enberg suggests that extended discretion without a standard may make
an income interest incapable of valuation.
92 Fischer v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 574 (3rd Cir. 1961) Power to sell and rein-
vest) ; Van Den Vymelinberg v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Wis.
1967) (Powers to sell and reinvest and, allocate trust receipts and expenditures
between income and corpus; Leonard Rosen, 48 T.C. 834 (1967) (Power to
sell and reinvest) ; Farha Schayek, 33 T.C. 629 (1960) (Power to accumulate
income) ; J. J. Newlin, 31 T.C. 451 (1958) (Power to terminate the trust).
93259 F. Supp. 315 (D.C. S.C. 1966).
94 Id. at 324; (The court did not state the evidence relied upon.
95 Note 83 supra.
96 Id. at 574.
9 Ibid.
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The case of J. J. Newln,9s represents an anomoly to the rule of the
Jones case. The settlor created a trust of corporate stock for the benefit
of his three adult children. Income of the trust was to be paid to the
beneficiaries in equal shares as requested. The trust could be terminated
at any time with the consent of all the beneficiaries. Corpus would then
be distributed on a pro rata basis. Although the trust specified no stand-
ard to which the beneficiaries must conform in terminating the trust the
court held that the income interests were capable of valuation. The
court reasoned that because the power to terminate the trust rested in
the income beneficiaries, rather than a third party, the possibility of
termination was too remote as to be negligible.
It is interesting to note that if this trust had been created under the
1954 Code the problem would not have arisen.99
VI. TYPES OF PROPERTY FREQUENTLY CONVEYED IN TRUST
A. CORPORATE STOCK
If corpus of a trust was composed of public corporation stock, the
market value of the stock on the date of the gift would probably be used
to determine the value of such corpus. If the term of the trust or the
donee's life expectancy were known, the value of an income interest could
easily be computed, provided the taxpayer could demonstrate that the
stock comprising corpus was capable of producing income. In Leonard
Rosen, 0  a recent Tax Court decision, two major stockholders in a pub-
lic corporation created an irrevocable trust for each of their minor chil-
dren by conveying shares of the corporate stock to third party trustees.
Each beneficiary had an unqualified right to net income of his or her
trust no less frequently than annually. The corpus of each trust was to
be distributed to the respective beneficiaries in installments beginning at
age twenty-five. Provision was made for gifts over if a child died prior
to a distribution date. The trustees were given power to sell the stock
and reinvest the proceeds.
The petitioners made no claim regarding the corpus of the trusts, but
asserted that the income interesets qualified for the annual gift tax exclu-
sion. The government did not challenge the exclusions on the ground that
the gifts failed to qualify as present interests, but took the position that
the so-called income interests were not susceptible of valuation. The cor-
poration, formed in 1957, had never paid dividends either before or after
the formation of the trusts in 1961. The petitioners argued that their
past record should not be controlling and that, because dividends might
be paid in the future the exclusions should be allowed. The Tax Court
held that the income interests created in the children were not sufficiently
98 31 T.C. 451 (1958). The case dealt with the 1939 Code, under which the power
to invade corpus or terminate the trust in favor of anyone including the income
beneficiary might cause the exclusion to be denied.
99 Note 57 supra.
100 48 T.C. 834 (1967).
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susceptible of reasonable valuation to constitute interests qualifying for
the $3,000 exclusion. The decision was based on two grounds. First,
because of an aggressive expansion policy of the corporation, the peti-
tioners were unable to demonstrate the probability of dividend payments
in a regular pattern. Second, the evidence of surrounding circumstances
justified the inference that the trustees intended to, and were expected
to retain the corpus of the trust despite the broad power of sale and re-
invesment.10 ' Of course, the petitioners' argument for allowance of the
excrusion under the second method was based on the premise that rein-
vestment would be in income producing property.
Restriction of transfer 0 2 and difficulty of valuing principal,,0 3 may
make a gift of close corporation stock undesirable if the donor seeks to
take advantage of annual exclusion. The variables involved in valuing
the stock itself may leave the gift open to contest by the Internal Reve-
nue Service. Earnings, dividends and dividend paying capacity, and book
value are significant factors to be weighed in valuation of close corpora-
tion stock.
1 0 4
If a reasonable value can be ascribed to the stock, the problems of
valuing an income interest appear to be similar to those encountered
when the trust corpus is composed of stock of a public corporation. In
Elsie McK. Morgan,'° a case involving the dividend payment record of
a close corporation, the Tax Court refused to allow the exclusion where
dividends had been paid in only two of the eleven years immediately pre-
ceding creation of the trusts in question. The court disregarded the fact
that dividends were paid after the exclusions had been challenged be-
cause the issue was whether or not the income interest was capable of
valuation at the datet of the gift.
B. LIFE INSURANCE
Another common subject matter of a gift that might cause valuation
problems is life insurance. A gift in trust of a life insurance policy, as-
suming it has a cash surrender value, creates two kinds of interests in
the donee; proceeds rights and policy rights.106 Proceeds rights are the
benefits payable to the beneficiary upon the death of the insured. Because
101 Id. at 847. The evidence of surrounding circumstances revealed that the trus-
tees were personal friends of the donors, and well acquainted with the latter's
business. The court seems to lay great weight on the donors apparent intent to
have the trustees remain in possession of the stock and the probability that the
fiduciaries would comply with that desire.
102 James v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d 236 (2nd Cir. 1945) (The case involved the
depression effect on value of stock, subject to an agreement restricting its
transfer.
103 Snyder's Estate v. United States, 285 F.2d 857 (4th Cir. 1961).
104 Central Trust Company v. United States, 305 F.2d 393 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
105 42 T.C. 1080 (1964), aff'd. per curiam, 353 F.2d 209 (4th Cir. 1965), cert. den.,
384 U.S. 918 (1966).
106 Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 25 T.C. 617 (1955), aff'd., 259 F.2d
231 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. den., 359 U.S. 913 (1959).
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these rights are "contingent upon death of thi insured they-are classified
as future.interests. 0O ,
i5o16j/-rigfits inlide the whole bundfe 6f incidents of owner-
ship of prop0rty in d policy-all rights except the right to pro-
ceeds. This bundle includes all the economic benefits of the in-
surance, the cash surrender value, the power to change the bene-
ficiary, the power to surrender or cancel the policy, the power to
assign the p6licy or revoke an assignment, the power to pledge the
'policy fbr a loan, the power to obtain from the insurer 'a loan
against the surrender value of the policy.'0.
The cash value at the date of the gift is an interest' that would'qualify
for the exclusioh if the trustee las"the powrer to surrender it for the
beneficiary's benefit. 0 9
The Regulations take'the rathei anomalous position that an outright
gift of an insurance policy is a present interest, even, in the' proceeds
rights,'if'thereare no restrictions of any kind in the policy or in the
instrument of' transfer.""' The rationale of this scheme of taxation was
explained in Cojnmissibner v. Chase-Manhattan Bank,112 where the court
stated, "Gift and estate taxation of insurance is not based upon receipt
of proceeds. It is based on the transfer of property rights. All gift and
estate taxes are based on the transfer of effective control over property
rights not the donees or heirs receipt of pioperty.'"'13 Where an assign-
ment of an insurance policy is held to be a gift of a present interest, sub-
sequent premium payments on such policy ar likewise held to be gifts
of present interests." 4 The fact that a policy does not' have a cash sur-
render value at the time of transfer is immaterial. The.test is whether
the interests of the donee. in the policy are in some manner restricted."5
Accordingly, restrictions inthe insurance policy itself may prevent the
transfer from qualifying for the exclusion.116
107 TREAs. REG. §25.2503-3 (C), example 2 (1958).
108 Commissioner v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 259 F.2d 231, 245-246 (5th Cir. 1958),
language taken from, BENJAMIN AND PIGMAN, Federal Estate and Gift Taxa-
tion of Louisiana Life Insurance, 28 TTjL. L. REv. 243,254 (1954).
10 9 LOWNDES AND KRAEMER, FEDERAL ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION, §33.12 (1962).
110 Sidney R. Baer, 12 Tax Ct. Memo. 914 (1943); TREAs. REG. §25.2503-3 (a)
(1958), provides:
The term [future interest] has no reference to such contractual rights as
exist in a bond, note (though bearing no interest until maturity), or in a
policy of life insurance, the obligations of which are to be discharged
by payments in the future. But, a future intereest or interests in such
contractual obligations may be created by tre limitations contained in a
trust or other instrument of transfer used in effecting a gift.
111 Rv. RUL. 55-408, 1955-1 Cum. BULL. 113.
112 Note 106 supra.
"13 259 F.2d 231, 255 (5th Cir. 1958).
14 Note 107 supra:
Example (6). L pays premiums on a policy of insurance on his life,
all of the incodents of ownership (including the right to surrender the
policy) are vested in M. The payment of premiums by L constitutes a
gift of a present interest in property.
115 Note 111 supra.
116 Joe 3. Perkins, 1 T.C. 982 (1943).
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Although the value of the gift may not vary significantly if both
proceeds and policy rights are transferred as opposed to a transfer of
only policy rights the basis for valuation is different. Replacement cost
is the usual criteria in the first instance,' 7 while cash value is usually
the standard in the latter.
C. BONDS
The exception in the regulations regarding life insurance also applies
to bonds." Even if the bonds were non-interest bearing they would
qualify for the exclusion. 1 9 In Commissioner v. Kempner,12° the donor
made gifts to minors of non-interest bearing notes payable in three and
four years. The gifts were held to qualify for the exclusion under the
1939 Code, because the trustees were to distribute proceeds to the donees
as soon as possible. The provision placed no real restrictions over the
proceeds of the property.
Although this writer has doscovered no direct authority on this spe-
cific point it would seem that a gift of Series E United States Savings
Bonds would qualify for the exclusion even though they pay no interest
until maturity.' "It would seem that the income interest from Series H
Bonds would qualify in any event because a table of checks issued clearly
indicates that an ascertainable flow of income can be predicted. The in-
terest is payable semiannually by check drawn to the order of the regis-
tered owner or co-owner.
22
VII. ALTERNATIVES TO A 2503 (b) TRUST
A. OUTRIGHT GIFTS TO MINORS
If the subject matter of a gift has an ascertainable value at the date
of transfer, an outright gift to a minor donee11 3 or his guardian, 12 would
avoid any further valuation problem. However, certain non-tax reasons
may make an outright transfer to the minor undesirable. Brokers, issuers,
purchasers and transfer agents would be forced to deal with the minor
at their peril, as he could disaffirm any transaction.2 5 The reluctance of
these people to deal with a minor donee may make it almost impossible
for him to convert the property to cash during his minority, the time
when funds may be needed most for support, education or a possible
emergency. In such an instance, the added expense of appointing a guard-
ian may be necessary.
117 TREAs. REG. §25.2512-6 (1958).
1s Note 110 supra.
119 Ibid.
120 126 F.2d 853 (5th Cir. 1942).
1231 C.F.R. §316.2(e) (1967).9122 31 C.F.R. §332.2(e) (1967).
123 John E. Daniels, 20 Tax Ct. Memo. 137 (1951).
124 United States v. Baker, 236 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1956) ; Beatrice B. Briggs, 34
T.C. 1132 (1960) ; REv. RUL. 54-400, 1954-2 CuM. BULL. 319.
125 URY, Gifts to Minors, 43 TAXEs 697 (1965).
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B. 2503(c) TRUSTS
A trust for a minor that would not otherwise qualify for the donee
exclusion might still be eligible if it is drafted according to the provi-
sions of section 2503(c). In essence, section 2503(c) provides that a
gift to a minor qualifies for the exclusion if the property and the income
therefrom may be expended for the benefit of the donee before his attain-
ing twenty-one years of age. Property not so expended must be conveyed
to the donee when he attains his majority. If the donee should die before
attaining the age of twenty-one, the unexpended income and corpus, if
any, must be payable to his estate or as he may appoint under a general
power of appointment." 6
In Commissioner v. Herr,1 27 the settlor established a trust for each
of four grandchildren, under which the trustee was to pay over the
income to the respective beneficiaries until age thirty and then to pay
over principal. During minority of the beneficiaries, the trustee was to
retain the income payable to any minor, reinvesting it and paying over
so much of the income as he deemed necessary for the maintenance and
support of the donee. All unexpended sums of accumulated income were
to be paid to the minor at his majority. The court allowed the exclusion
on the basis that 2503(c) applied to an interest in income even though
the donee had no present right to corpus. The basis for the courts deci-
sion was that the word property, as used in the statute, is not synony-
mous with corpus. The point was reiterated in Rollman v. United
States,12 where the court followed the Herr case and reasoned:
Since Section 2503 applies to all forms of gifts, it covers a transfer
of property in which the property itself is income, viz., an assign-
ment of rents. Income rights may be productive of income, e.g.,
interest on an overdue installment, interest on income after re-
ceipt, or an increment upon the investment of income received.12 9
An income interest may qualify for the donee exclusion under
2503(c) although it would obviously be barred under 2503(b) . 13 For
126 INT. REwv. CODE op 1954 §2503 (c), provides:
(c) TRANSFER FOR THE BENEFIT OF A MINOR-No part
of a gift to an individual who has not attained the age of 21 years on
the date of such transfer shall be considered a gift of a future interest
in property for purposes of subsection (b) if the property and income
therefrom-
(1) may be expended by or for the benefit of, the donee before at-
taining the age of 21 years, and
(2) will to the extent not so expended-
(a) pass to the donee on his attaining the age of 21 years, and
(b) in the event the donee dies before attaining the age of 21
years, be payable to the estate of the donee or as he may
appoint under a general power of appointment as defined in
section 2514(c).
127 303 F.2d 780 (3rd Cir. 1962) ; followed in, Rollman v. United States, 342 F2d
62 (Ct. Cl. 1965) ; Carl E. Weller, 38 T.C. 790 (1962).
128 342 F.2d 62 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
129 Id. at 67.
130 Jacob Konner, 35 T.C. 727 (1961).
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example, a trustee may accumulate income under a 2503(c) 'trust and
the dbnee's-ifiterest therein will still qualify "for the exclusion.' 13 In
Carl E. Weller,1 32 the Tax, Court stated, "Income during the term of
the trust'can be accumulated but'is required tb be paid over to the -bene-
ficiary as he or she attains majority:" 1 33
The method of valuing an income interest for a term of years is
exactly the same for a 2 503(c) trdst13 4 as for a 2503 (b) trust. 3 5 How-
ever, under a 2503 ('b) trust the donee must demonstrate that the corpus
is capable of generating income at a: minimum rate, and that income will
be distribufed to the donee on a regular basis. It would appear that under
a 2503(c) trust the donor would qualify the gift of"income for th ex-
clusion merely by sho~ving that the ificome is capable of generating in-
come at the specified rate becduse the exclusion may be taken even
though the trustee has disCretion 'to accumulate income.
At -first blush, a trust drafted within the provisions of 2503(c)
appears to have many advAntages to a 2503(b) trust but, caution must
be observed at the drafting stage or the transfer may 'not qualify for the
exclusion under either provision"21 If an attempt is made to draft a
trust under 2503 (c), there can be no substantial restrictions either upon
the exercise of the trustee's discretion to determine the amounts of in-
come or property to be expended for the benefit of a minor, or upon the
purpose for which the expenditure is to be made. 3 7 The question of
what is or is not a substantial restriction on the trustee's exercise of dis-
cretion has been a recurring problem in litigation involving 2503(c)
trusts to date.3 " In Commissioner v. Thebauf,'39 the donor conveyed
property in trust, income of which 'was payable to minor beneficiaries
annually or in the trustee's discretion. Any unexpended income and
corpus were to be distributed when the beneficiary attained the age of
twenty-one. The trustee, however, was not given the power to expend
corpus for the beneficiaries' benefit during minority. The restrictionon
corpus was found to be substantial. In a recent Revenue Ruling, 40 the
commissioner declared that a trust which provided the trustee with dis-
cretion to expend property or income for a beneficiary's support, care,
education, comfort and welfare during his minority was not a substantial
restriction on the trustees exercise of discretion, because the purposes
13' Carl E. Weller, 38 T.C. 790 (1962) ; Jacob Konner, 35 T.C. 727 (1961).
132Id.
133 Id. at 809.
134 Carl E. Weller, 38 T.C. 790 (1962).
135 Discussed in an earlier section of this article.
136 Commissioner v. Thebaut, 361 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1965) (The exclusion was
denied regarding corpus).
1' TREAS. REG. §25.2503-4(b) (1) (1958).
'3s Duncan v. United States, 368 F.2d 98 (5th Cir. 1966) ; Commissioner v. The-
baut, 361 F.2d 428 (5th Cir. 1965) ; Ross v. United States, 348 F.2d 577 (5th
Cir. 1965).
139 Note 136 supra.
'40 REv. RUL. 67-270.
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of such .expenditures,,had. ho objective limitation. Furthermore, 'such
terms when read as a whold tend -to approxinidtd the scope of "the term
"benefit" as used in section 2503 (c).'41
C. WISCONSIN GIFtS, TO MINORS ACT
In Wisconsin, even though a gift to a minor is not income producing,
it can qualify for the gift tax exclusion by the use of the Wisconsin
Gifts to Minors Act, 142 which covers gifts of money, securities, life in-
surance1 4 3 and annuities.'4 A gift made under its-provisions qualifies
for the donee exclusion 145 because legal title vests in the beneficiary 146
and is similar in effect to an outright gift. 47 Thus the entire currently
ascertainable value of an interest qualifies forthe exclusion .1 4 The Gifts
to Minors Act is deemed most useful where the corpus of the trust is
relatively small and the donor is not reluctant to allow the donee to re-
ceive unexpended corpus and income at the age of twenty-one. 49
ROBERT J. MURRAY
1-11 Note 126 supra.
142 WIS. STAT. §§319-61-71 (1965), as amended by Ch. 46, Laws of 1967. The Wis-
consin Act is patterned after the Revised Uniform Gifts to Minors Act, 9B
U.L.A. (1966).,
143 Id. at §319.61(5). A question has been raised regarding the availability of the
annual exclusion for life insurance, PEIRSOL, Gifts to Minors, How Effectively
has the Uniform Act Functioned?, 25 N.Y.U. INsT. FED. TAX. 1099 (1967).
'44 WIs. BAR. BULL., Oct. (1967) at p. 11.
'45 REv. RUL. 59-357, 1959-2 CuM. BULL. 212; Rv. RUL. 58-86, 1956-1 CuM. BULL.
449.
146 WIS. STAT. §319.63(1) (1965).
147 WIS. BAR BULL., Oct. (1967) at p. 11; NoT, 69 HAxv. L. REv. 1476, 1479 (1956).
14847 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 9 (1963) The act cannot be used to convey only an income
interest).
149 Note, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1476 (1956).
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